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Unlike the others in this collection of articles, I was Don Ochs’ classmate 
for three years.  When taking classes in classical rhetorical theory or 
practice, he tended to share instructional tasks with the professor-of-
record.  His classical education was exemplary.  He had drunk deeply of 
the Greco-Roman brew. He was a man whom you could ask, “So what are 
you doing at 2:34 p.m. tomorrow?” and get a precise reply—the most 
totally organized doctoral student I’ve ever met (so unlike the rest of us). 
By the time that he had left Iowa with his Ph.D. and then returned to 
the faculty, and by the time that he and John Waite Bowers had taught 
their movements class and written their book, I was long gone to my job 
at the University of Michigan.  I taught my first graduate seminar on 
social movements in the fall of 1969, back when we still talked about the 
women’s liberation movement as exercises in public bra-burning.  In my 
first or second year of teaching that class, however, Bowers and Ochs 
provided me with a pre-publication, dittoed copy of the text.  I learned 
how to teach that seminar from those purple pages. 
And that fall is where I’ll begin this far too brief review of the 
literature on social movements relevant to Bowers and Ochs’ book (1971).  
I’ll commence with that late ‘60s period, following the arc of some of the 
directions movement studies flowed across the decades, and finish by 
explaining how and why, amazingly perhaps, the third edition of the book 
is still relevant to today’s popular agitation. 
Born in the Late ‘60s 
Bowers and Ochs1 were writing their book amidst the blossoming of 
exciting rhetoric-relevant literature on social movement studies.  The 
signal cannon that first fired scholars’ imaginations about this kind of 
work appeared in Leland Griffin’s dissertation (1949), article (1952), and 
then book chapter (1958) on the rhetoric of “historical movements.”  He 
set up a dialectical pattern for analyses of pro- and anti-groups in mortal 
combat as opposing warriors.  He laid out a traditional three-stage model 
                                                        
1 I will refer to “Bowers and Ochs” as the authorial team even though there are 
now four authors for the current edition.  I’m doing so because I’m essentially 
following the impact of that first edition on the field.  I certainly appreciate the 
contributions of the other two authors. 
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of rhetorical battle—in his case, periods of inception, rhetorical crisis, and 
consummation. As Lucaites, Condit, and Caudill (1999) have noted, he 
never really defined “movement,” that is, defined what it is that “moves,” 
except of course time. 
The initial pattern for the rhetorical studies of social-political 
movements thus was set in this way.  Robert Cathcart (1972, 87) 
formalized the dialectical model when arguing that movements are 
distinguished from other kinds of rhetorical events through reciprocal 
acts offered up by movements and the established order, what he called “a 
dialectical enjoinment in the moral arena.”  Scholars such as Herbert 
Simons (1970), Robert Scott and Donald Smith (1969), Robert Scott and 
Wayne Brockriede (1969), and Arthur Smith [now Molefi Asante] (1969) 
worked in the same way.  Movements came to be understood as 
confrontations between an institutionalized entity and (usually) a non-
institutionalized attacking and de-stabilizing social-political force. 
The three-stage model—essentially a model of beginnings, middles, 
and endings—was popular.  Eric Hoffer in his famous The True Believer 
(1951) argued that what he termed “mass movements” needed “men of 
words” to generate public notice, “men of action” to exert physical and 
symbolic forces on the targets, and then “men of words” once more to 
bring them to a successful close.  Gronbeck (1972) outlined the different 
rhetorical functions played by movement discourses across the three 
phases, and Griffin himself (1952) had suggested the different kinds of 
content needed to keep the movement working forward. 
And then there was the question, “What moves?” in social-political 
confrontations.  Griffin (1952) never really got beyond noting that the 
passing of time produced different events that might be relevant to 
movement strategy and discursive effectiveness.  Gronbeck (1972) 
discussed “force fields”—social-psychological, political-institutional, and 
philosophical-ideological forces—that affected how the University of 
Michigan and the Black Action Movement on its campuses affected the 
ways that the principal actors disputed with each other in different stages. 
But the major player in this discussion became Michael Calvin McGee 
(1980, 1983), who in special issues of the journal Communication Studies 
very persuasively argued that what “moves” in social-political movements 
are (1983, 76) “states of mind people are in when they fool themselves 
into believing that they are part of a ‘movement.’” States of consciousness, 
not material bodies, are what become re-formed when movements have 
their social-political effects.  Simons (1970) had urged that movement 
leaders had to manage the physical resources available to the group to 
succeed; McGee said, no, what must be managed are beliefs, attitudes, 
values, and especially self-identities. 
All in all, Bowers and Ochs’s book was almost perfectly adapted to 
prevailing conceptions of social movements and contemporary 
understandings of rhetorical confrontations.  They grounded their 
analysis of social change within prevailing theories of social organization, 
French and Raven’s (1953/1960) enduring taxonomy of the bases of social 
power, rumor studies in order to talk about changes in message 
characteristics as they flow through social organizations, and, most 
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characteristically, their own assemblage of progressively more forceful 
rhetorical strategies for agitation: 
 petition 
 promulgation 
 solidification 
 polarization 
 nonviolent resistance 
 escalation/confrontation 
 Gandhi and guerrilla 
 revolution 
as well as progressively more forceful strategies for control: 
 avoidance 
 suppression 
 adjustment 
 capitulation 
Within each of these strategies, there were habitual tactics to be employed 
in pursuit of them. 
What made Bowers and Ochs’s approach to rhetorical strategies and 
tactics so very useful was that their progressivist theory of communicative 
instrumental and symbolic behaviors was not predictive,2 but rather 
based on a conception of communication competence.  Dell Hymes (1962) 
had reshaped Noam Chomsky’s version of that idea in his taxonomies of 
“the ethnography of speaking.” Bowers and Ochs, however, pioneered a 
rhetorical understanding of that idea, that is, of arguing that 
communication competence reflected significant leveraging of social-
political power in practical communication situations.  Competent 
agitators generally move through the strategies from the least to the more 
and more disruptive; likewise, agents of control try avoidance before 
suppression, etc. With communication competence or sophistication 
conceived of as a rhetorical standard, even movements that seemingly 
“failed” nonetheless could be adjudged rhetorically sophisticated and 
strategically sound—and hence sources of lessons worth emphasizing.  
                                                        
2 Actually, in the final chapter of the book, Bowers and Ochs (1971) laid out a 
figure (“Encounters between agitation and control”) to chart predictions of 
outcomes in the clash—what they called the interface.  Using three bilateral 
characteristics agitating peoples might have (high/low membership, high/low 
potential membership, and high/low sophistication) and three possible 
characteristics of control groups (high/low power, strong/weak ideology, and 
high/low sophistication), they attempted predictions of outcomes.  Notice that 
both agitation and control  draw strength from “sophistication”—what I’m calling 
competence.  That idea is key to the whole book, its progressive arrangement of 
strategies as well as its predictive generalizations. 
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The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (1971) was in many ways a 
practical-conceptual summary of what had been learned about social-
political movements or popular-institutional confrontations up to that 
point in the twentieth century. 
New Paradigms for Consciousness Theories of 
Movements 
As the ‘70s unfolded, as revolutionary fever calmed, and as different sorts 
of reform or even revolutionary forces came into play in societies around 
the world, the dialectical paradigm of agitation and resistance underwent 
adjustment, even radical retheorizing.  Let me point to only three of the 
new paradigms that took on the patina of “post-‘60s thinking” in this 
arena of thought.  First, a bundle of three consciousness theories that 
floated through the 20th century. 
Perhaps the most famous of the psychological theories of extreme 
behavior was articulated in the late nineteenth century by Gustave Le Bon 
(1895/1896).  His theory of mob psychology—that collective riotous 
behavior created mind-sets that were more extreme than those held by 
any individual in the mob—was highly popular.  Crane Brinton 
(1938/1965) produced historical research on the English, American, 
French, and Russian revolutions that affirmed Le Bon’s theory, though he 
preferred to talk about states of fever that would strike a collectivity, 
running its course through periods of violence until it dissipated and the 
country could return to conditions of moderation and quiescence.  Today, 
perhaps the greatest French sociologist of social movements, Alain 
Touraine, has done close textual studies of the self-conceptions or world-
views of what he calls “social actors” in their relationships to others in of 
their perceptions of their environments.  The book of his that I own, 
Return of the Actor:  Social Theory in Postindustrial Society 
(1984/1988), examines the shifts in industrial actor’ interrelations in Italy 
from the labor-organizing “red years” of 1919-20 to the fascist “black 
years” of 1921-22.  He traces the altered interpersonal relations among 
individuals in close textual analyses of newspapers that abetted such a 
radical cultural shift. 
In all, such consciousness studies take seriously Bowers and Ochs’ 
understanding of communication as instrumental, symbolic behavior 
guided by an emphasis on individual and collective consciousness as the 
locus for social-political change. 
Even more popular in rhetorical and communication studies are 
works treating image events or media campaigns.  Kevin DeLuca (1999) 
has been one of the principal architects of this paradigm in his research 
on “image events” that are staged to gain significant attention from 
especially the television press and Internet devotees in various countries.  
If confrontational dramas are played out before cameras, they are 
accorded significance and cultural importance by viewers in their very 
specularity and “newsworthiness.”  There are not always clearly defined 
“agitators” and “control” groups—think of the diffused segments and their 
variegated goals that comprised the Occupy movement and, for that 
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matter, the range of institutions that occupiers demeaned as enemies of 
the 99%. 
Such splintering or diffusion of both agitating and controlling groups 
is visible in two of the chapters added to the third edition of Bowers and 
Ochs (1971/1993/2010):  one on the anti-WTO “Battle in Seattle” of 1999 
and the other on the protest of some 14 million people across the world on 
15 February 2003 against the upcoming invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and 
its “coalition of the willing.”  Because of the differences and even 
dissociations between and among those comprising both agitation and 
control in those situations, there were no coordinated strategies or 
common tactics of attack and defense, negotiations between competing 
entities was fragmented, and victory or defeat was impossible to define. 
Image events making up media campaigns for social-political-havoc 
raise havoc with our understanding of what constitutes “communication 
competence” in such diffused public performances.  There usually is no 
central leadership or command structure.  Established institutions cannot 
focus their attention on official spokespersons, for there are none.  Whose 
competence should be challenged?  That can be impossible to know. 
Let me mention a third kind of study coming into prominence in the 
twenty-first century:  work on the roles of the new social media in social-
political change.  Social media played highly significant parts in the series 
of WTO protests from Seattle to Genoa to Quebec City to Salzburg and 
beyond.  Even more impressive was the assemblage of worldwide anti-
invasion of Iraq marches in 2003.  The coordination of so many people in 
so many national capitals around the world would have been impossible 
without a cheap and efficient communication technology. 
But we are discovering that the social media can do much, much more 
than work as telephones.  They’ve become the eyes and ears even of the 
mainstream media.  The new “two-step flow” of media information and 
opinion is no longer a flow from one person to another, but rather, from 
Internet-embedded or smart-phone transmitted audio/video feeds to a 
licensed radio or television operation.  The small portable camera or 
phone can transit in places where the mainstream networks do not have 
access or permission to set up.  Private individuals transmit photos and 
streaming video that permit secret, hidden suppression of and assault 
upon protesting citizens to be made fully public.  Fact-checking can be 
carried out by people on the ground almost immediately after reported 
events.  Instantaneous news can be gathered even without broadcast 
media’s uplinks.   
Social movements have been transformed by their use of new 
technologies, and the public’s access to agitation from around the world 
has been revolutionized by the digital connections now possible between 
local and global communication systems. 
A Third Edition in a Changing World 
Even the face of the new paradigms coming out of consciousness studies, 
media studies, and the digital revolution, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control appeared in a third edition in 2010 in time for its fortieth 
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anniversary.  Why?  Obviously, the owners and editors of Waveland Press 
recognized something in the book’s quality and its relevance to rhetorical 
and communication studies of the twenty-first century. Anyone reading it 
can sense the quality of its conception, writing, and direct relationships 
between its theoretical framing and the usefulness of that framing in 
directing scholars’ attention to signal actions in practical social-political 
controversies.  But why else? 
I suggest that countries around the world have witnessed a robust 
rebirth of social-political dialecticalism.  While not always quite on the 
scale of the revolutions that Brinton (1938/1965) wrote about, agitation in 
recent times often erupts quickly, massively, and excitedly, as in a 
feverish drive for radical change.  We are not celebrating a return of the 
‘60s culture, but of aspects of agitational forms that are now operative 
within today’s environments. 
Students of the New Right movements in the U.S.—think about the 
Moral Majority, the Neocons of the Reagan revolutions, the post-1994 
Gingrich legislative blueprint with its amalgamation of religious and 
political conservatism, and the Tea Partyism of the last three years—have 
witnessed dialectical confrontations between existing religious, political, 
and governmental institutions and what we now identify as “value-based” 
cultural groups seeking power and institutional leverage.  The hot-pink 
value issues—abortion, same-sex marriage, gun control, death penalty—
are perennially on social-political agenda somewhere in this land every 
year.  They thrive on two-valued logics that allow for no compromise but 
for this very reason heighten their attractiveness as image events for the 
news camera.  They’re still living off the dialectical model of agitation and 
control. 
Not only the right has kept dialecticalism alive.  We’ve already noted 
leftist backlash movements from around the world.  The post-9/11 anti-
war movements, the Occupy movements both in the U.S. and elsewhere, 
and certainly the democratic populism at work in conservative Muslim, 
Arab, and African countries leading to the Arab spring and larger African 
revolutions are relevant instances of left-leaning protests and loud shouts 
for broad social-political-governmental turnover.  Less bloody but equally 
disruptive are election-based changes-of-government recently in France 
and Italy, with economically conservative governments tossed out in favor 
of liberal agenda proposing comparatively radical change in the Euro 
Zone, even jingoistic cries to return to nativist currencies.  Those 
elections, too, went forward riding on strongly dialectical arguments that 
framed the contests. 
The chapters that the newest author of this book, David Schulz, has 
added to the third edition recognize and begin to incorporate some of 
these post-‘60s paradigms for movement studies.  As yet, the blending of 
the consciousness, image event, and social media paradigms with the 
competency model for assessing dialectical agitational performances and 
force is not smoothly done, but it’s coming along nicely.  As any good 
student of social movement knows, adaptation is a key to success not only 
for movements and those who would resist them, but for the scholar who 
is working to comprehend the conditions that spawn them, the 
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happenings that ignite them, the force-vectors that propel them, and the 
wise people of words who return societies to conditions of stability and 
quietude following their runs. 
May The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control help new cohorts of 
students and their mentors to pursue these tasks for another forty years. 
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